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Abstract: Unethical behavior within organizations is not rare.  We investigate experimentally the 
role of status-seeking behavior in sabotage and cheating activities aiming at improving one’s 
performance ranking in a flat-wage environment.  We find that average effort is higher when 
individuals are informed about their relative performance. However, ranking feedback also favors 
disreputable behavior. Some individuals do not hesitate to incur a cost to improve their rank by 
sabotaging others’ work or by increasing artificially their own performance. Introducing sabotage 
opportunities has a strong detrimental effect on performance. Therefore, ranking incentives should 
be used with care.  Inducing group identity discourages sabotage among peers but increases in-
group rivalry.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
It is traditionally assumed in standard economic theory that competition is desirable for 
several different reasons. Competition leads to an efficient allocation of productive resources on 
the market, giving consumers better products to a lower price. It promotes innovation by increasing 
the cost of failing to invest in research and development. Competition also enhances overall 
performance within firms by inducing employees to exert higher work effort. The tournament 
literature has shown how monetary prizes based on ranking of performance provide strong 
incentives to outperform (e.g. Lazear and Rosen, 1981; Bull et al., 1987; Hannan et al., 2008).  
While feedback on relative performance may motivate employees to work harder by 
strengthening competitive preferences, they may also potentially encourage some individuals to 
engage in unethical activities in order to improve their ranking, which may have important 
detrimental effects for the firm (Lazear, 1989; Konrad, 2000; Chen, 2003).1 For instance, a worker 
can increase his chances of winning a contest by reducing the output of a person with whom he is 
competing through means of sabotage (Lazear, 1989; Garicano and Palacios-Huerta, 2006; 
Harbring et al., 2007; Falk et al., 2008; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008; Carpenter et al., 2010; 
Abbink and Hermann, 2011; Balafoutas et al., 2012).2  Similarly, workers may also cheat to 
artificially improve their performance by the use of performance-enhancing drugs, forgery, use of 
ghostwriters or plagiarism (List et al. 2001; Preston and Szymanski, 2003; Enders and Hoover, 
2004; Shleifer, 2004; Fanelli, 2009; Schwieren and Weichselbaumer, 2010).  
In this current paper, we contribute to the existing literature by investigating the extent of 
unethical activities such as sabotage or cheating activity to improve one’s own performance and 
their consequences on overall performance. We aim primarily at investigating the determinants of 
                                                 
1 According to the SUMER survey, on working conditions and hostile behavior in the workplace (49,984 respondents), 
conducted by the French Ministry of Employment (2008), 17% of workers declare that they have been victim of 
unethical behavior, including sabotage in the workplace.  Such unethical activities can seriously harm the overall 
performance of the firm by discouraging effort, increasing absenteeism or inducing health problems. In the same vein, 
a survey by the Workplace Bullying Institute reports that 35% of the 4,210 respondents have experienced repeated 
mistreatment ranging from intimidation to sabotage in the workplace. This survey reports several cases of individuals 
who decided to leave the firm after having been sabotaged several times by other workers.  
2 Sabotage activities within firms can take several forms including locking someone's workstation, transferring false 
information to coworkers, destroying the work of others, or stealing company supplies or equipment. For instance at 
Digital Equipment, a major American company in the computer industry during the 1990s, workers invaded the 
computer files of co-workers to make electronic copies and claimed the work as their own.  In academia, Maher (2010) 
cites the example of a postdoctoral student who destroyed a colleague's experiments to get ahead, a cautionary note 
for supervisors. 
 2 
unethical activities.  In particular, we check whether a pure taste for having the best rank in the 
performance distribution, apart from any possible material benefits associated or not with this rank, 
serves as a motivation for engaging in unethical activities.3  The previous literature has assumed 
that unethical activities are motivated by the possibility of receiving higher earnings.  However 
one may reasonably argue that such unethical activities may also be driven at least in part by the 
pure intrinsic desire for having a higher rank. This could be the case for instance if individuals 
have a strong concern for status and if status-seeking is related to the desire for dominance in 
competition (Charness and Grosskopf, 2001; Charness and Rabin, 2002; Abbink and Sadrieh, 
2009).  
Status seeking can be also related to self-image (Benabou and Tirole, 2006; Koszegi, 2006), 
public recognition (Frank, 1985; Moldovanu et al, 2007, Rustichini, 2008) or the joy of out-
performing others (Chowdhury and Sheremeta, 2010; Dohmen et al. 2011).4 Some recent research 
in neuroeconomics and biology has shown that such intrinsic competitive preferences may be 
“evolutionarily” rooted in our behaviors (Tran and Zeckhauser, 2012). Outperforming others 
would be associated with higher concentrations of serotonin, a neurotransmitter in the brain that 
enhances feelings of well-being (Madsen, 1994) by activating the neural circuitry associated with 
reward processing (Dohmen et al., 2011).  Other recent behavioral studies have provided some 
evidences that people may be willing to harm others even in the absence of immediate or future 
expected monetary return, which may be partially explained by a strong desire for dominance 
(Zizzo and Oswald, 2001; Zizzo, 2003; Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009; Abbink et al., 2009 ; Bolle et 
al., 2011).5  
                                                 
3 Although surveys provide interesting information regarding the extent of unethical behavior in the workplace, 
nevertheless the individual determinants of unethical activities can hardly be observed directly in survey data because 
of the hidden nature of these activities. Controlled laboratory experiments may help in investigating these 
determinants. See Charness and Levine (2010) for survey evidence on attitudes towards sabotage in various scenarios. 
4 The role of relative position in individual utility has been substantially investigated in many social sciences.  
However, mainstream microeconomic theory has traditionally assumed that utility is a function only of one’s own 
absolute income, with the notable exception of Duesenberry (1949), Veblen (1949), or Frank (1985).  Experimental 
studies have demonstrated both the importance given by individuals to status and how it affects behavior in 
negotiations (Ball and Eckel, 1996), markets (Ball and Eckel, 1998; Ball et al., 2001), coordination games (Eckel and 
Wilson, 2007), and organizations either in cooperative settings (Eckel et al., 2009) or in competitive settings 
(Huberman et al., 2004; Rustichini and Vostroknutov, 2008).   
5 In a seminal paper, Zizzo and Oswald (2001) design a game where subjects can reduce (burn) other subject’s money 
at own costs. Despite the own cost of burning money, the majority of subjects choose to destroy some part of others’ 
money. Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) go one step further by considering the case of two players who can simultaneously 
destroy each other’s endowment without any conventional reason to do so. The authors observe that up to 40% of 
subjects are willing to burn money, in particular in when agents can hide their action and assume impunity. In a recent 
study, Bolle et al. (2011) investigate the determinants of vendettas. The authors observe that vendettas frequently 
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From a methodological point of view, we chose to implement a flat-wage scheme with 
equal wages in order to properly isolate this pure effect of competitive preferences from the 
monetary reasons why feedback about rank may incite individuals to engage in unethical 
activities.6 Indeed in a context where monetary incentives are strong enough to actually motivate 
people to work hard, it is difficult to disentangle the pure motive of competitive preferences from 
other motives. We acknowledge that in many firms more sophisticated remuneration schemes 
either based on individual or group performance are common and that long-term material concerns, 
including future promotions or salary increases are likely to be related to performance rank.  
Nevertheless, the use of a fixed-pay regime is not totally disconnected from real life. Indeed 
despite the important literature showing the positive effects of performance-based remuneration 
schemes (e.g. Lazear, 2000), the use of flat-wage schemes remains surprisingly high within firms 
(e.g. Nguyen and Leung, 2009; Bartling and von Siemens, 2010; Franceschelli et al., 2010).7  These 
observations were summarized twenty years ago by Holmström and Milgrom (1991): “It remains 
a puzzle for this theory that employment contracts so often specify fixed wages and more generally 
that incentives within firms appear to be so muted, especially compared to those of the market”. 
The role played by flat-wage schemes is even more prominent when considering the public sector 
where employees are paid fixed salaries depending strictly on time worked (e.g. Ding et al., 2001; 
Prentice et al., 2007; Bartling and von Siemens, 2010).8 Furthermore, while remuneration is in 
some cases tied to performance, the fixed portion still constitutes the larger proportion of workers’ 
compensation.  
                                                 
occur even when initial endowment are equal and despite the fact that vendettas are pointless. In a related money-
burning experiment, Abbink et al. (2011) observe that equal distributions are also particularly prone to destruction. 
6 We note that this is a reasonably standard approach in experimental economics.  For example, this was also the 
strategy used in Dohmen and Falk (2010) and Falk and Ichino (2006).  From the latter paper: “In our experiment, we 
implemented a fixed-pay regime, that is, payments were not conditioned on output.  This was done in order to keep 
things as simple as possible.” 
7 Indeed, there are some cases, particularly in the public sector, where promotions and salary are almost wholly 
unaffected by performance.  For example, promotions and salary increases for civil servants in the U.S. Postal 
Service are almost entirely based on seniority, and these workers are also largely immune from being fired for poor 
performance. 
8 Several factors may explain the persistence of flat-wage schemes within firms including the role of egalitarian 
concerns (Ding et al., 2001; Bartling and von Siemens, 2010), monitoring costs, and centralization of authority 
(Prentice et al., 2007).  Some authors have also investigated the reasons behind the persistence of flat-wage schemes 
in the public sector. These factors include the specificities of multi-faceted tasks and intrinsic motivation for public 
service that may compensate for quite low and relatively flat extrinsic incentives that the sector offers (Georgellis et 
al., 2011). 
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Unethical activities may be possible in such an environment because paying a flat wage 
does not necessarily imply the absence of any feedback on relative performance. Indeed, firms 
commonly provide relative performance information to their employees even when employees’ 
compensation is not tied to peers’ performance (e.g. Anderson et al. 1982; Nordstrom et al. 1990; 
Tafkov, 2012). In such contexts, individuals simply substitute wages comparisons for effort 
comparisons and relative position is therefore determined not by income but by work 
performance.9 In banking, for example, some branch managers disclose to their tellers the number 
of new accounts opened by each of their colleagues even though teller compensation has no 
incentive-based pay (Gino and Staats, 2011). In the public sector, employees are typically paid a 
flat wage but are still evaluated and ranked by their supervisor. And even when firms do not 
provide direct feedback on relative performance, the degree of proximity among co-workers may 
lead them to compare each other (e.g. Falk and Ichino, 2006; Mas and Moretti, 2009). 
Another aim of this study is to investigate how the opportunity for unethical behavior 
influences the impact of social information on overall output. While economic theory has 
discussed in depth the positive effects of relative performance information in tournaments or under 
piece-rate payment schemes (Hannan et al., 2008; Azmat and Iriberri, 2010a,b; Blanes i Vidal and 
Nossol, 2011; Eriksson et al., 2009, find more nuanced results), the effects of feedback on relative 
performance in a flat wage environment that permits unethical behavior are unclear a priori.  Some 
studies observed a positive effect of feedback with fixed compensation (Falk and Ichino, 2006; 
Mas and Moretti, 2009; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012; Taafkov, 2012). Other studies have shown 
that feedback about rank may also de-motivate the lowest-performing employees (e.g. Barankay, 
2012). However, while the studies mentioned above have focused their attention on the incentive 
effect of relative performance information under full wage compression, they are silent about the 
unethical activities in such contexts.  Sabotage activities may have both direct and indirect negative 
impacts on performance.  Its direct effect is that it destroys valuable resources, and particularly 
resources created by the most able individuals who are also those who are sabotaged more often 
(Chen, 2003). Indirect effects include demoralization and retaliation (Harbring et al., 2007; Abbink 
and Hermann, 2011).  Sabotage may also lead workers to exert less effort because they anticipate 
that they might be the victims of sabotage (Carpenter et al., 2010).  We do not expect such a 
                                                 
9 In our experiment, relative position is determined by work performance in a real-effort task. Therefore, status is 
endogenous. In most experimental studies, status is assigned exogenously (with the exception of Ball and Eckel, 1998; 
Huberman et al., 2004; Rustichini and Vostroknutov, 2008). 
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negative impact of an artificial increase of performance compared to sabotage activities, as it does 
not affect directly any co-worker’s output. However, it may indirectly reduce the motivating 
impact of ranking feedback, as individuals know that this information can be biased. To the best 
of our knowledge, we provide the first experiment on sabotage and cheating activities under a flat 
wage.  
Our experiment consists of four treatments.  In our baseline treatment, participants are 
matched in groups of three and each participant is required to perform a real-effort task (a decoding 
task) under a flat-wage scheme without any feedback on relative performance.  The ranking 
treatment is similar to the baseline except that each participant is now informed about her relative 
performance. Our two remaining treatments (the sabotage and the redemption treatments) are 
identical to the ranking treatment except that we add a new stage in which participants can pay to 
change their relative performance either by reducing the performance of their co-workers 
(sabotage) or by purchasing extra units of ‘output’ to increase artificially their own performance 
(redemption).  We ran two variants of the ranking, sabotage and redemption treatments, with or 
without symbols to visually emphasize the performance ranks in the group.10 By comparing 
behavior in our different treatments we can isolate the pure effect on performance of the feedback 
on relative performance from the effects of introducing opportunities of either sabotage or 
redemption activities when wages are fixed.   
Our results show that, even when wages are fixed, many individuals exhibit competitive 
behavior.  Individual performance is positively influenced by feedback on one’s relative position 
in the group, as people exert significantly more effort when they know they will receive ranking 
feedback.  However, while providing feedback on ranking creates additional incentives, it also 
invites unethical behavior, as some individuals are willing to pay to improve their rank by 
sabotaging others’ work or by increasing artificially their own relative performance.  Indeed, 
                                                 
10 In companies, status is often reinforced by means of symbolic awards such as the “Bravo Award" at IBM, the 
“Employee of the Month" at McDonald's or gold medals for good attendance. Similarly, informal sanctions may take 
several forms such as frowning ‘emoticons’, social embarrassment, or public disgrace. In the workplace, Grasmick 
and Kobayashi (2002) showed that non-monetary sanctions based on socially-imposed embarrassment are proposed 
to be deterrents to employee noncompliance with organizational rules. Regulators are also experimenting with the 
public disclosure of inspection results, names of violating companies in public registers, or shaming offenders in the 
media (Van Erp, 2008). In Denmark and the UK, scores on the doors are associated with negative smileys showing 
the extent to which restaurants do not comply with hygiene standards. In California, a utility company gave customers 
feedback by printing neighborhood comparisons on energy bills, along with a “smiley face” for bills with relatively 
low energy usage and a frown for those with high usage.  
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introducing the opportunity to sabotage others’ output has a strong negative direct and indirect 
impact on performance.  The effect of redemption activities on performance is also negative, but 
to a more moderate degree.  We also find evidence that people from the same school are more 
likely to improve their own relative position artificially, although they are less likely to sabotage 
people from the same school than people from other schools.  This suggests that group identity 
favors rivalry but discourages destructive competition.  Overall, our findings provide evidence of 
competitive preferences in non-monetary competitive settings.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 describes the experimental 
design.  Section 3 presents our behavioral conjectures about the expected treatment effects.  The 
results of the study are presented in section 4.  Section 5 discusses our findings while section 6 
concludes. 
2. EXPERIMENTAL DESIGN 
2.1. Treatments 
Our experiment consists of four main treatments with ten periods each and is based on a between-
subject design.  In our baseline treatment, each person is matched with two other participants.  We 
use a stranger matching protocol, so that groups are randomly reformed at the beginning of each 
new period. Participants are paid a flat wage of 10 Experimental Currency Units (with 10 ECU 
equal to one Euro) at the beginning of each period; it is common information that wage is 
uncorrelated to performance.  Participants have to perform a task during a maximum of two 
minutes. This task consists of decoding sets of one-digit numbers into letters from a grid of letters 
that is displayed on the computer screen (see instructions in the on-line appendix).  In each new 
period, a different grid of letters and different decoding numbers appear.  This fastidious and 
boring task was chosen to induce sufficient disutility.  Participants must press a button to start a 
new period and immediately receive the wage for the period.  In every period they can solve as 
many problems as they wish.  They can stop working at any time during the course of the period, 
they can resume work at will, and they can choose not to perform the task at all.  To allow for 
alternative leisure activities on the job, two magazines are provided in each cubicle and the 
instructions indicate that it is allowed to read them at any time. In the field, leisure at work takes 
multiple forms: surfing the net, long coffee breaks, office gossiping, etc. 
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The participants are continuously informed about their current number of correct answers.  
If a submitted answer is not correct, the same letter is displayed until the correct answer is 
provided.  Once the two minutes have elapsed, a vertical bar is displayed on the screen; its height 
indicates the total number of correct answers.  In this treatment, people receive no feedback about 
the performances of the other two group members.  
The ranking treatment is identical to the baseline except that the computer displays three 
vertical bars with the performance of each of the three group members at the end of each period.  
Each person is therefore able to see her relative performance and her rank; the worker who has 
performed the best in her group is ranked first while the lowest performer is ranked last.  We ran 
two variants of the ranking treatment, with or without symbols to visually illustrate the relative 
performance in the group.  Specifically, in the treatment with symbols the worker who has 
performed the best in her group receives a “gold medal” while the lowest performer gets a “donkey 
hat” on his computer screen.  We consider whether adding symbolic rewards and sanctions crowd-
in or crowd-out the effect of feedback on performance.  
 The redemption treatments (with and without symbols) are identical to the ranking 
treatments, except that we add a second stage in which participants can modify their performance.  
In stage two, participants have the opportunity to purchase extra units of ‘output’ to artificially 
increase their performance and possibly their rank in the performance distribution.  They can buy 
from 0 to 20 units of output that are added to their original performance; the cost of each unit is 
0.5 ECU.  At the end of this stage, the computer program displays the final performance of each 
group member, and the associated ranking.  
The sabotage treatments are similar to the redemption treatments except that in the second 
stage participants can pay to reduce the performance of their co-workers.  They can assign from 0 
to 20 costly points to each of the other members ‘to reduce their score’.  Each point assigned by 
player i to player j reduces player j’s performance by one unit of output and this may modify the 
provisional ranking resulting from performing the task in stage one.  Assigning points is equivalent 
to sabotage.  While player j’s earnings are unaffected by receiving sabotage points, a participant 
who sabotages incurs a cost of 0.5 ECU per point of sabotage that is subtracted from the wage to 
determine the final earnings for the period.  While each sabotage or redemption point costs the 
same, we acknowledge that in some cases, one redemption point allows the participant to improve 
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her position relative to the two other group members, whereas one sabotage point targets only one 
person.  This brings up the issue of relative cost.11   
As in the redemption treatment, participants can observe any change in the performance of 
the three group members at the end of the second stage.  However, while they can see if their group 
members have artificially increased their own score in the redemption treatment, they are not 
informed about who has sabotaged their output.  We also conducted a variant of the sabotage 
treatment with symbols to illustrate ranks. 
Buying redemption and sabotage points can be associated with status-seeking, as the ranks 
or trophies earned will be displayed on the screen of the group members at the end of each period.  
In addition, this information will be also provided after groups have been re-matched in the next 
periods.   Indeed, the participants can see the profile of their two co-workers at the beginning of 
each period.  In the baseline treatment, the profile includes the group members’ gender and school.  
In all the other treatments, it also includes a historical record of the number of times a participant 
has been ranked first and last throughout the previous periods.  In the treatments with symbols, the 
screen displays the number of gold medals and donkey hats accumulated by each group member.  
The accumulation of displayable ranks and symbols builds the social image of the participant over 
time.  It is important to provide this information ‘publicly’ since image and status require publicity.  
This also allows us to investigate the importance of in-group effects on decisions, and notably 
whether in-group biased individuals are less willing to sabotage their peers.  Indeed, the literature 
in social psychology and economics has shown the importance of group identity on behavior 
(Brewer, 1999; Akerlof and Kranton, 2000; Charness et al. (2007), Halevy et al., 2008; Chen and 
Li, 2009; Delfgaauw et al., 2009).   
2.2. Procedures 
The experiment consists of 44 sessions of ten periods each.  26 sessions were conducted at the 
CREM-CNRS (LABEX) institute of the University of Rennes 1 and 18 others were conducted at 
the GATE-CNRS institute of the University of Lyon, France.  Between nine and 15 individuals 
took part in each session, for a total of 585 participants who were invited via the ORSEE software 
(Greiner, 2004). The participants were undergraduate students from a variety of majors including 
                                                 
11 In the context of public good games it has been found that the decision to punish is influenced not only by the cost 
of punishment but also by its impact on the target (Masclet and Villeval, 2008; Nikiforakis and Norman, 2008).   
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business, economics, law, engineering, medicine and literature. Table A in online appendix 
displays summary information about the sessions.  The experiment was programmed using the Z-
tree platform (Fischbacher, 2007).  The experiment lasted on average 90 minutes and each 
participant earned an average of 14.64 Euros, including a show-up fee of 5 Euros. 
 
3. BEHAVIORAL HYPOTHESES 
If one assumes that individuals maximize their own payoff, the theoretical prediction for the 
baseline treatment is straightforward: the minimum effort possible should be exerted.  The same 
prediction applies to the ranking treatments. In the redemption and sabotage treatments, the only 
subgame-perfect equilibrium of the game, whether played once or finitely repeated, is for no 
participant to work and purchase redemption or sabotage points. 
One may, however, relax some assumptions and consider that participants may have an 
intrinsic motivation for working.  Intrinsic motivation includes self-esteem, interest and pride in 
one’s work, an innate sense of duty to honor contractual obligations (Baron, 1988; Kreps, 1997; 
James, 2005; Ellingsen and Johanesson, 2008), or a sense of fulfillment (Deci, 1975; Kuhnen and 
Tymula, 2012).  Several studies of the gift-exchange game have shown that, despite the absence 
of any penalty for shirking, workers respond to flat wages by exerting non-null effort levels (Fehr 
et al., 1993; Gneezy and List, 2006; Cohn et al., 2009; Gächter and Thöni, 2010; Kube et al., 
2012).  This holds even in the absence of repeated relationships or when wages are exogenously 
chosen (Falk and Ichino, 2006; Kuhnen and Tymula, 2012; Dohmen and Falk, 2010).  Based on 
this and although our task is fastidious, we can write the following hypothesis:  
H1: Even under flat wages, individuals exert positive levels of effort. 
Intrinsic motivation can be reinforced by feedback on relative performance and social 
comparisons.  Individuals may be motivated by their relative performance, enjoy out-performing 
others, and desire even the modest status feasible in our experiment because it improves social 
(and perhaps even self) image.  Indeed, there is strong evidence that people care not only about 
their own payoffs but also about social image and status (Ball and Eckel, 1998; Huberman et al., 
2004; Rustichini, 2008; Eckel et al., 2009; Clark et al. 2010; Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011).   
Concerning performance comparisons, several studies have found positive effects of 
feedback on effort provision.  Under a flat wage scheme, Falk and Ichino (2006) and Mas and 
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Moretti (2009) show that peer effects increase productivity when workers can observe each others’ 
output.  This supports the idea that individuals incur disutility when falling behind their fellow 
workers.  Kuhnen and Tymula (2012) observe that agents work harder when they observe their 
ranking and underline the role played by self-esteem and desire for dominance.12  A recent 
neuroeconomic study revealed that outperforming others activates the neural circuitry associated 
with reward processing (Dohmen et al. 2011).  A notable exception is Barankay (2012), who finds 
a negative effect of rank feedback on salesmen’s effort in a natural field experiment, due to a ‘de-
moralization effect’ of being informed about a lower than expected rank.  Based on most of these 
previous findings, we conjecture that the positive effect of rank feedback on performance should 
dominate.   
The expected net effect on motivation of adding symbols to materialize ranks is unclear. 
On the one hand, symbols may incite individuals to outperform others in order to obtain a trophy 
or to avoid the stigmatization of a negative symbol (e.g. Kosfeld and Neckermann, 2011; Pan and 
Houser, 2011).  On the other hand, previous studies have shown that small monetary but also non 
monetary rewards such as gold stars, candies or thank-you gestures may crowd-out intrinsic 
motivation (Deci, 1975; Harackiewicz, 1979; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Cameron et al. 2001; 
Frey and Jegen, 2001; Shalley et al., 2004).  A person may be reluctant to work for a small 
symbolic compensation because this may signal to others her willingness to accept a very small 
reward, which weakens her social image (Ariely et al. 2009).  Based on these findings and on the 
fact that, in our current study, symbols have no real value per se, particularly in terms of 
recognition from the principal (Ellingsen and Johanesson, 2007), we conjecture that adding 
symbols would reduce performance.  This is summarized in the following hypotheses. 
H2: a) In a flat-wage environment, providing rank feedback increases performance. b) The 
introduction of symbols has a net negative effect on performance.  
 Our next hypotheses concern the effects of sabotage or redemption.  We are not aware of 
any study on redemption or sabotage activities in settings with a flat payment scheme.  Sabotage 
has been widely studied in tournaments with monetary prizes (Lazear, 1989; Garicano and 
Palacios-Huerta, 2006; Harbring et al., 2007; Falk et al., 2008; Harbring and Irlenbusch, 2008; 
Carpenter et al., 2010).  These studies suggest that the rationale for sabotage lies in the urge to 
                                                 
12 A positive effect of rank feedback has been identified under piece rate payment schemes and in tournaments (Azmat 
and Iriberri, 2010a,b; Hannan et al., 2008); however, Eriksson et al. (2009) found mitigated results. 
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earn more, as its frequency increases in the size and spread of prizes.  But sabotage could also 
result from the desire to win per se.  For example, destructive activities such as money burning 
can be partly explained by a desire for dominance (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009).13  We conjecture 
that in our experiment individuals may sabotage if they value their status sufficiently highly and if 
they have strong competitive preferences and desire for dominance.  For similar reasons, 
individuals may artificially increase their own performance even under a flat wage scheme.  Since 
for the same cost each redemption point may allow an individual to increase her position relative 
to the two other participants, while one sabotage point targets only one individual, we conjecture 
that participants buy more redemption points than sabotage points.  This is stated precisely in H3:  
H3: a) Individuals with strong competitive preferences may sabotage others or increase 
artificially their own performance.  b) Individuals should buy more redemption points than 
sabotage points.   
 
Our last conjecture concerns the effects of sabotage and redemption on performance.  We expect 
strong negative effects of sabotage on net performance.  Such destructive effects have been 
observed in the context of monetary tournaments.  Sabotage may reduce the efficiency of an 
organization for three main reasons: i) it destroys resources, in particular if the highest performers 
are also those who are more likely to be sabotaged (Chen, 2003); ii) it de-motivates workers if they 
anticipate that they will be the victims of sabotage (Carpenter et al., 2010); and iii) it may lead to 
retaliation if the saboteur’s identity is revealed (Harbring et al., 2007; Abbink and Hermann, 2011).  
In a flat-wage environment, we expect sabotage to induce a significant decrease of initial 
performance (by destroying output) and final performance (net of sabotage activity). Even if 
workers are re-matched after each period, sabotage may also lead to blind revenge.  We expect 
less negative effects of redemption activities on initial performance and motivation, as they do not 
alter co-workers’ output. This is stated in H4: 
H4: Sabotage has a detrimental effect on both initial and final performance by destroying output 
and discouraging effort. The impact of redemption activities on initial performance is also 
negative, but to a more moderate degree. 
4. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS 
                                                 
13 Sabotage may also be due to pure nastiness. In that case, one should observe that individuals sabotage indifferently 
the lowest and the highest ranked co-worker.  
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This section presents a comparative analysis of performance across treatments, before studying the 
determinants of redemption and sabotage activities.  
4.1. Determinants of performance 
Our findings reveal that informing participants about their relative performance in the ranking 
treatment increases work effort compared with the baseline treatment. Introducing the opportunity 
to artificially change one’s own relative performance does not greatly affect work effort in the 
redemption treatment but decreases performance in the sabotage treatment, both in comparison to 
the ranking treatment.   
4.1.1. Performance levels across treatments 
Consider first the treatments without symbols.  The average performance is 23.15 units per period 
in the baseline treatment and 28.84 units in the ranking treatment.  A Mann-Whitney pairwise test 
indicates that this difference is significant (p=0.010).14 These findings are consistent both with H1 
and H2.  The mean initial score in the redemption treatment (28.14 units) is slightly (but not 
significantly) lower than in the ranking treatment.  The mean final performance (28.99 units) is 
almost the same as the performance in the ranking treatment.  Sabotage has a negative impact on 
both initial and final performance.  The mean final performance is 25.09 units, which is 
significantly lower than in the ranking treatment (p=0.010).  Interestingly, sabotage has also an 
indirect negative effect on initial performance.  On average, initial performance is 25.51 units in 
the sabotage treatment, which is significantly lower than in both the ranking (p=0.045) and the 
redemption treatments (p=0.082).  Consistent with H4, these findings indicate that sabotage totally 
offsets the positive effects of feedback on performance both directly by destructing final 
performance but also indirectly by de-motivating individuals. 
Figure 1 displays the time path of average initial performance by period in all treatments 
without symbols. Figure 2 describes the distribution of initial performance per treatment. The 
corresponding figures for the treatments with symbols are available in the online appendix (fig. A 
and B).  These figures report similar findings. 
[Figures 1 and 2: about here] 
                                                 
14 All the tests reported in this paper are two-tailed Mann-Whitney pairwise tests with each session as an 
independent observation, unless specified otherwise. 
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Figure 1 shows that after an initial jump in performance between periods 1 and 2, likely 
due to learning, the average performance decreases after period 5 in all but the ranking treatment.  
This evolution suggests that performance comparisons prevent a decline in performance provided 
that there is no opportunity for unethical behavior.  Figure 2 indicates that feedback reduces both 
the variability in performance and the number of no-effort (or very low effort) choices.  The 
frequency of no-effort choices is 7.77% in the baseline and 0.60% in the ranking treatment, which 
differ significantly (p=0.018).  In sharp contrast, it is 8.19% and 6.17% in the sabotage and 
redemption treatments, respectively, which is not different from the baseline (p=0.669 and 
p=0.623).  This is probably because the positive impact of feedback is offset by the refusal of some 
individuals to work in such an unethical environment.   
The econometric analysis reported in Table 1 provides more formal support to these results.  
Table 1 consists of three panels.  The first panel displays the results of a regression in which the 
dependent variable is the initial individual performance in the treatments without symbols.  The 
second panel displays a similar regression for the treatments with symbols.   Finally the third panel 
presents the results of estimates on pooled data (with and without symbols).  Models (1) to (3) are 
Generalized Least Squares models with robust standard errors clustered at the session level to 
control for serial correlation within each session.  To check the robustness of our results, models 
(4) and (5) are random-effect Tobit models controlling for the number of left-censored 
observations.  The independent variables include treatment dummies, a dummy variable for 
periods 6 to 10 and several demographic variables.15  In addition, we include in models (3) to (5) 
several interaction variables to check whether adding symbols influences initial performance in 
each treatment.  Model (5) also controls for trend differences across treatments in the second half 
of the game.   
[Table 1 about here] 
Model (1) shows that providing feedback on relative performance has a positive and significant 
effect on initial performance.  All else equal, players’ effort is predicted to increase by 5.89 units 
in the ranking treatment compared with the baseline.  The dummy variable “redemption” also 
                                                 
15 The demographic variables include gender, being a student at the university versus in another school, studying 
economics, and location (Rennes or Lyon). These variables are not significant or if significant, not robust. We checked 
whether males were more sensitive to ranking information by including an interaction variable “ranking*gender” in 
the estimates (available upon request). This variable is insignificant, indicating the absence of gender effect regarding 
ranking information in our experiment.  
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captures a positive and significant coefficient, indicating that individuals also provide more effort 
in this treatment than in the baseline.  Performance is 5.32 units higher than in the baseline.  
Introducing the opportunity to sabotage reduces both the value and the significance of the effect 
of feedback on ranking, suggesting that the positive effects of ranking are almost totally offset by 
the introduction of sabotage activities.   
Model (2) reports qualitatively similar results for the treatments with symbols, although the 
coefficients are both smaller and less significant.  Models (3) and (4) confirm these findings, 
showing that symbols have a negative effect on initial performance (only significant in the ranking 
treatment). This supports our conjecture H2 that symbols may crowd out intrinsic motivation in 
absence of real value per se.  In model (5), the coefficients of the interaction variables 
“ranking*periods 6-10” and “redemption*periods 6-10” are positive and significant. This 
confirms that status concern mitigates the decline of performance observed in the second half of 
the baseline.  The variable “sabotage*periods 6-10” is not significant, probably because the impact 
of status concern is offset by the refusal of some individuals to work in such a hostile environment.  
. 
In other Tobit regressions (available upon request), we estimate separately the determinants 
of final performance in the redemption and the sabotage treatments, with the ranking treatment as 
the reference.  For the redemption treatment, we ran two estimates.  In the first one, the independent 
variables include a dummy variable for the redemption treatment, a trend term and the usual 
demographics.  In the second estimate we add the number of points purchased and a dummy for 
the individuals who never bought redemption points throughout the game.   For the sabotage 
treatment, we include a dummy for the sabotage treatment, the numbers of assigned and received 
points, a dummy variable for the participants who never sabotaged throughout the game as well as 
an interaction term to control for those who never sabotaged and do not suffer from sabotage at 
the current period.   
The coefficient associated with the redemption variable is not significant, indicating that 
the final performance in the redemption treatment does not significantly differ from the ranking 
treatment.  Indeed, we learn from the second estimate that if the number of redemption points 
purchased has a positive effect on final performance (coeff. =0.806***, S.E. = 0.074), this effect 
is offset by the fact that those who never purchase redemption points have significantly lower final 
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performance (coeff. =-5.790***, S.E.=1.564).  Regarding the sabotage treatment, the net effect of 
sabotage on final performance is clearly negative compared to the ranking treatment (coef.=-
4.032***, S.E.=1.472).  This is mainly due to the receipt of sabotage points (coeff.= -0.886***, 
S.E.=0.079) and to the fact that those who never sabotage decrease their effort significantly (coeff. 
=-5.280***, S.E. = 1.635). This is even the case for those who did not receive any sabotage point 
(coef.=-2.995***, S.E. 0.641), indicating a clear demotivating effect of working in such a hostile 
environment.  Finally, those who assign sabotage points tend to have a higher final performance, 
although the difference is not significant.16  Our main findings are summarized in Results 1.  
Results 1. a) Feedback has a positive significant effect on performance in the ranking treatment. 
b) Relative to the ranking treatment, this effect is decreased by the introduction of sabotage due to 
both a destruction of final performance and a de-motivating effect on initial performance. c) The 
introduction of symbols to illustrate rank has a slight negative effect on initial performance.  
 
4.1.2. Status seeking and the dynamics of performance 
The rank in the distribution of performance and status-seeking activities in the previous period 
may be important determinants of subsequent performance.  To measure these effects, we focus 
now on the impact of feedback on changes in individual performance across periods.   
Table 2 reports estimates on the determinants of changes in individual performance between 
period t-1 and period t in random-effects Generalized Least Squares regressions in each treatment.  
The independent variables in model (2) include rankxi variables corresponding to the position of 
participant i. These variables are dummies that equal 1 if the individual is in relative position x in 
the distribution, and 0 otherwise (with x = 1, 2 or 3 for the highest, intermediate and lowest 
position, respectively).  We also include interaction terms “rankxi *symbol” corresponding to the 
relative position of participant i in the treatments with symbols.  In addition, we include a variable 
to test for the influence of changes in the relative position of a subject in the distribution of 
performance due to status-seeking activities in the previous period.  The rank3i in (t-1)*change 
variable equals 1 if the subject has ended up in the lowest rank in period t-1 while she had a higher 
rank at the end of the first stage of the previous period, and 0 otherwise.  Finally we include the 
                                                 
16 In the redemption treatment, the mean final performance is 25.07 (S.D.=12.12) for the participants who never bought 
redemption points and 31.87 (S.D.=6.68) for the others. The corresponding values in the sabotage treatment are 21.29 
(S.D.=13.20) and 27.85 (S.D.=6.24). These statistics are based on pooled data of treatments with and without symbols. 
Similar findings are obtained on separate treatments.  
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number of sabotage points assigned and received. Model (3) displays a similar estimate for the 
redemption treatments with the same variables as in model (1) except that we add the number of 
redemption points purchased by the individual in the previous period.   
 [Table 2 about here] 
Table 2 indicates that, in all treatments, having a lower rank in the distribution in t-1 leads 
people to increase their effort in the next period, confirming that performance comparisons support 
motivation in each treatment.  This finding is consistent with studies showing that people ranked 
worse (better) than expected increased (decreased) output (Schultz et al. 2007; Kuhnen and 
Tymula, 2012).  Furthermore being a victim of sabotage has a significant negative impact on future 
effort.  Interestingly, those who purchase sabotage or redemption points exert significantly more 
effort in subsequent periods, indicating that sabotage (redemption) and work effort are 
complementary activities.  Our findings are summarized in Results 2. 
Results 2. a) A lower rank in period t-1 induces people to increase their effort in the next period. 
b) Individuals who buy sabotage or redemption points in t-1 increase their subsequent effort. c) 
Being a victim of sabotage in t-1 has a significant negative effect on future work effort. 
4.2. Determinants of redemption and sabotage activities 
In the treatment without symbols, 6.94% of individuals purchase sabotage points and 15.34% buy 
redemption points in a period in the treatments without symbols. In the treatments with symbols, 
these proportions are respectively 13.75% and 15.20%. While the proportions of cheaters in a 
period are relatively low, they may nevertheless be rather realistic since one does not expect a high 
proportion of people in the field to engage frequently in sabotage or redemption.  However when 
considering the entire session, we observe that 34.72% of individuals buy at least one sabotage 
point during a session and 35.00% of individuals buy at least one redemption point during a session 
in the treatments without symbols.17 In the treatments with symbols, these percentages are 51.39% 
and 41.33%, respectively. Thus, a very substantial proportion (one-third to one-half) of all 
participants is willing to spend money to affect their relative rank without any positive effects on 
their own income. 
                                                 
17 The explanation behind these differences of percentages is that most players do not buy points repeatedly. Some 
may buy points only when their relative performance puts them at risk of finishing the period as the worst performer; 
others when they are not far from getting the first rank. 
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The participants buy on average 0.41 sabotage points (S.D.=2.87) and 0.85 redemption 
points (S.D.=1.55) per period in the treatments without symbols. A Mann-Whitney pairwise test 
indicates that people assign significantly more redemption than sabotage points (p=0.068), which 
is consistent with H3. The high standard deviation indicates that there is a great deal of 
heterogeneity among individuals. In the treatments with symbols, players buy on average 1.07 
sabotage points (S.D.=3.05) and 0.78 redemption points (S.D.=2.56). These numbers are not 
significantly different (p=0.460).  Thus, more sabotage points were assigned in the treatment with 
symbols than without symbols (p=0.044) while no difference was found between the two 
redemption treatments (p=0.753). The fact that sabotage is stronger in the treatment with symbols 
suggests that symbols activate overtly-destructive competitive preferences more for those who are 
inclined to engage in unethical activities. 
In the treatments without symbols, those who sabotage buy an average of 4.00 points 
(S.D.=3.12), which represents 20.00% of their income for the period. Similarly, those who pay to 
increase their performance purchase 5.59 points on average (S.D.=5.26), representing 27.95% of 
their income for the period. In the treatments without symbols, those who sabotage buy an average 
of 5.11 points (S.D.=5.13), 25.55% of their income for the period, and those who buy redemption 
points purchase 5.11 points on average (S.D.=4.59), 25.55% of their income for the period).  
4.2.1. Status seeking and redemption 
Table 3 provides a more formal analysis of the determinants of redemption and sabotage activities.  
The left panel reports two random-effect Tobit regressions on the determinants of the number of 
redemption points participant i buys to artificially increase her performance (models (1) and (2)). 
The right panel reports similar regressions on the determinants of sabotage (models (3) and (4)).18  
In models (1) and (2), the independent variables include the participant’s initial performance and 
its squared value to test for potential non-linearity, the rank in the distribution, a dummy variable 
for periods 6 to 10 and another dummy for the treatment with symbols.  The “tie in performance” 
variable equals 1 if the participant’s initial performance is identical to the performance of another 
group member, and 0 otherwise.  We control for demographic variables. Model (2) also accounts 
for the characteristics of the two co-workers to identify the presence of in-group effects.  Precisely, 
“same gender” takes the value 1 if all group members are either males or females, and 0 otherwise.  
                                                 
18 Separate estimates for treatments with and without symbols report very similar findings. 
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“Same school” equals 1 if all the group members belong to the same school and 0 otherwise.  Last, 
“mean cumulated rank1-i” (“mean cumulated rank3-i”) variables indicate the mean number of times 
co-workers have received the highest (lowest) rank in total previous periods.  These variables 
indicate the mean status of co-workers. 
[Table 3 about here] 
These regressions show that the higher their initial performance, the more individuals buy 
redemption points.  Controlling for performance, the rank2i and rank
3
i variables have highly 
significant positive coefficients, indicating that participants buy more redemption points when they 
occupy the intermediate or the lowest position in the distribution compared with those who hold 
the highest position.  They also buy redemption points to differentiate themselves from other group 
members in case of a tie.  These findings support H3.  No difference is found across treatments 
with and without symbols.  Last, belonging to the same school and having the same gender as the 
two co-workers has a positive and significant impact on the willingness of people to increase their 
performance artificially.  This finding suggests the existence of rivalry between in-groups.  Our 
findings are summarized in Results 3.  
Results 3. a) Individuals buy redemption points to improve their ranking and to differentiate 
themselves from others. b) There exists a positive relationship between initial performance and 
redemption activity. c) Group identity in terms of gender and school leads individuals to artificially 
increase their performance. 
4.2.2. Status seeking and sabotage 
The right panel of Table 3 reports estimates on the determinants of the number of sabotage points 
assigned by player i to player j.  In addition to the independent variables included in models (1) 
and (2), in model (4) the “ranki2*rankj1” and “ranki3*rankj2” variables are dummies indicating 
when i occupies the intermediate and the lowest position while j occupies the highest and the 
intermediate one, respectively. The “tie in performance” variable equals 1 if i’s initial performance 
is identical to j’s performance, and 0 otherwise.  We control for demographic variables. 
As for redemption, the harder individuals work, the more they sabotage.  We find a more 
significant inverted U-shaped relationship between initial performance and the number of sabotage 
points.  After controlling for performance, the positive effect of “rank2i” and “rank3i” in model (3) 
indicates that those who are not the best performers are more likely to sabotage.  The coefficients 
of these variables are no longer significant in model (4) when “rank2i* rank1j” and “rank3i* rank2j” 
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are included. The positive and significant coefficients of these interaction variables suggest that 
individuals only target the participant who is ranked immediately above them.  Participants assign 
more sabotage points when a co-worker’s performance is equal to their own.  Our analysis 
confirms our previous findings that sabotage is significantly higher in the treatment with symbols, 
suggesting that symbols reinforce the competitive preferences of those who are inclined to exert 
unethical activities.19  Having received sabotage points in the previous period has a significant 
positive impact, suggesting that sabotage is also partly motivated by blind revenge.     
 Finally, our data indicate that the composition of the group may matter.  The variable “mean 
cumulated rank3-i” has a significant and negative coefficient: the presence of low-status co-workers 
(who accumulated a higher number of last ranks in previous periods) reduces the willingness to 
sabotage.  Belonging to the same school as the other group members reduces the willingness to 
sabotage.  A possible interpretation is that people are reluctant to sabotage their peers because of 
in-group preferences.  Belonging to the same gender does not generate the same behavior, 
suggesting that this confers a weaker sense of group identity.  These findings differ from our 
previous results on redemption. One interpretation is that in a group of peers people are particularly 
competitive provided that rivalry does not harm others.  Our findings summarize in Results 4. 
Results 4. a) Individuals sabotage i) to achieve a better rank in the group, ii) to differentiate in 
case of ties and ii) to retaliate blindly. b) Individuals sabotage more in the treatment with symbols. 
c) There is an inverted U-shaped relationship between sabotage and effort. d) Belonging to the 
same school reduces the participants’ willingness to sabotage.  
4.2.3. Robustness test 
One might be concerned about one assumption of our treatments because of the possibility that it 
is the certainty of being close to another person's performance level that drives cheating. Indeed, 
in real-world settings, individuals are not always informed about their exact relative performance. 
Therefore, they may be more reluctant to engage in cheating, since it is more difficult to correctly 
anticipate its effect on final rankings. We addressed this issue by designing a new sabotage 
                                                 
19 This finding is in apparent contradiction with our previously identified crowding-out effect of symbols on 
performance. However this may simply reflect the heterogeneity of participants. Those who have strong competitive 
preferences are even more willing to sabotage in the presence of symbols, while the others decrease their effort even 
more. Another possible explanation may be that people exert less initial effort in anticipation that sabotage is going to 
be higher. 
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treatment with uncertainty and with symbols.20 In this treatment, participants cannot observe their 
true relative output at the end of the first stage. They are only informed about an approximate value 
of each co-worker’s performance randomly drawn from an interval [x-2, x+2]. More explicitly, 
participants are informed about their exact own performance. In contrast, they can only get a signal 
of others’ performance that is randomly chosen among the values: x-2, x-1, x, x+1, x+2. This 
treatment is included as a robustness test to check whether unethical activities might be also 
influenced by uncertainty about one’s relative position.  
In a period, 17.50% of the participants buy sabotage points, while 13.75% did so in the 
treatment with certainty.  The direction of this difference is opposite of what would be found in 
relation to the concern mentioned above. When considering the entire session, our data show that 
the percentage of saboteurs is relatively stable with respect to the degree of uncertainty. The 
percentage of participants who buy at least one sabotage point during a session is 50.00% in the 
new treatment, while it was 51.39% in the treatment with certainty. The estimation of a random-
effects Tobit model in which the number of sabotage points is the dependent variable shows that 
the difference between these two treatments is not significant.21 
This finding may be due to the existence of two opposite effects: uncertainty may refrain 
some individuals to engage in sabotage as it is difficult to anticipate its impact on final ranking; 
others may seek to compensate for the effect of uncertainty by sabotaging even more to increase 
their chance of getting a better rank.  
5. DISCUSSION  
Our data confirm that even under a flat wage scheme most individuals exert substantial effort, 
especially when they learn their ranking.  This suggests that feedback about rank gives additional 
incentives to outperform.  At the same time, rank feedback leads some individuals to incur a cost 
to sabotage the work of others or to increase artificially their own output. Our intuition is that 
paying people a flat wage and giving them feedback on their performance ranking leads those who 
have competitive preferences to invest in status-seeking activities, including unethical ones.   
                                                 
20 We chose to focus on the sabotage treatment as it provides the clearest evidence of detrimental effects on overall 
performance; we would expect quite similar effects of uncertainty in the redemption treatments. 
21 This model is similar to model (4) in Table 3, except that we only consider the treatments with symbols and the 
independent variables include a dummy variable for the treatment with uncertainty. The p-value for this treatment 
dummy is p=0.633. N=2806; log-likelihood=-2022.19. This regression is available upon request. 
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An objection to this interpretation in terms of competitive preferences is that feedback may 
simply convey information regarding norms about the appropriate productivity level.22 
Alternatively, individuals may work harder because they want to signal that they are smart. 
Although we acknowledge that these reasons are plausible, these interpretations are inconsistent 
with some of our findings.  In particular, both redemption and sabotage activities are relatively 
inconsistent with an interpretation in terms of signaling or social norms.     
Another possible objection to this interpretation is that both effort choices and the purchase 
of sabotage and redemption points may simply derive from the fact that participants feel committed 
to perform the task and buy points in order to please the experimenter perceived as an ‘authority’ 
(see Zizzo, 2010 on experimenter demand effects).  Levitt and List (2007) also raise the concern 
that in a laboratory setting, morality issues can affect participants’ behavior especially because 
their actions are scrutinized.23  Although we acknowledge that such effects may exist, this 
interpretation is unlikely to account for our results for several reasons.24  First, we were careful to 
avoid having our own students in the experiment, to use no frame in the instructions, and to 
minimize the interactions between the players and the experimenter.25  Second, we have designed 
a neutral environment. Third, even if some forms of authority relationship between the participants 
and the experimenter did still exist, this would mirror the field setting where such a vertical 
relationship exists, enhancing the external validity of our experiment. Finally, a demand effect 
could not explain all the differences observed across treatments.   
We interpreted the fact that people exert positive effort under the flat wage scheme in the 
baseline in terms of intrinsic motivation. However, another interpretation is that individuals chose 
to perform because they may have perceived the real-effort task as simply a computer game and 
feel fun to play it. We acknowledge that this possibility may exist.  Yet, several precautions have 
                                                 
22 We thank an anonymous referee for this helpful remark. 
23 In any case, to the extent that such an effect is present, it would imply that the level of unethical behavior that we 
observe is something of a floor.  Another typical concern of Levitt and List (2007) is that participants in typical lab 
experiments are not representative of the population and that the stakes are low compared to real settings.  We 
acknowledge that our results should probably be limited to highly educated people.  As regards the stakes, it should 
be acknowledged that they are small in our experiment.  But if we observe sabotage and redemption for such low 
stakes, we can reasonably anticipate that their likelihood should be higher for higher economic stakes. 
24 Nevertheless, to the extent that the participants feel scrutinized, it is reasonable to think that this should lead them 
to emphasize moral norms; if this was the case, our findings regarding sabotage and redemption activities are 
probably underestimated relative to a natural setting. 
25 A debriefing written questionnaire asking players to describe their strategy does not show any evidence for such a 
demand effect. 
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been taken to minimize such effect.  First, we were careful to choose a task that was sufficiently 
fastidious to avoid such bias. Second, we allowed for alternative leisure activities on the job. Third, 
the fact that we observe variance both across treatments and among participants in the provision 
of effort seems to indicate that people did not simply decode for fun and that decoding tasks 
required a real and costly effort. In particular, several individuals chose to exert no effort at all in 
the baseline.  Finally, if the disutility of effort is decreased because the individuals find the task 
enjoyable, it might be considered as intrinsic motivation.  
One may also argue that our observation of unethical activities may be biased. First, one 
might conjecture that the level of unethical behavior may be overestimated due to the cost 
associated with such behavior in real life (notably the penalty if caught) that are absent in this 
study. Note, however, that due to the informal nature of such activities, it is difficult for a firm to 
set up mechanisms that would allow detection. It seems that peer sanctions are more probable. 
Second, one might also argue that the observed unethical behavior might be explained by pure 
nastiness (Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009). However, it seems that it is not really the case as individuals 
buy redemption or sabotage points either to reach the highest rank in their group or to avoid the 
lowest one.  This behavior is therefore more consistent with status-seeking motivated by 
competitive preferences and desire for dominance (Rustichini, 2008).  Third, one may postulate 
that the observed unethical behavior may simply reflect noise, confusion or boredom. Although 
we cannot totally exclude the possibility that some decisions may have been taken randomly, this 
interpretation is unlikely to account for our results for several reasons. Our data analysis clearly 
shows that decisions to sabotage or to buy redemption points are not chosen randomly. As shown 
in our estimates, sabotage points are assigned either i) to achieve a better rank in the group, ii) to 
differentiate in case of ties or ii) to retaliate blindly. In the same vein, individuals buy redemption 
points to improve their ranking and to differentiate themselves from others. Furthermore, we also 
observe a positive relationship between effort and unethical activities, which is clearly inconsistent 
with the notion that these reflect confusion or boredom. Indeed, we observe an inverted U-shaped 
relationship between sabotage and effort and a positive relationship between initial performance 
and redemption activity.  
One might also be concerned with the assumption regarding the anonymity of sabotage 
activities. To what extent would providing individuals with information regarding those who 
sabotaged them in the past and allowing them to retaliate lead to more or less sabotage? Previous 
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experiments on money-burning and public good experiments with punishment have shown that 
the effect of information is not clear-cut.  One the one hand, individuals refrain from destroying 
money if they anticipate possible retaliation (Nikiforakis, 2008; Abbink and Sadrieh, 2009).26  On 
the other hand, the opportunity to avenge previous destruction may lead to escalation and vendetta 
(Zizzo, 2003; Bolle et al., 2011). Introducing a risk of detection could be an interesting extension 
of our paper. 
 
6. CONCLUSION 
There are many examples in everyday life at work in which people invest resources in non-
productive activities to improve their own relative position in their reference group.  This may lead 
to interpersonal or organizational deviance and to illegal or unethical practices like plagiarism, 
forgery, and sabotage.  Our experiment investigates the existence of such behavior in a setting 
where we pay participants a flat wage to perform a task, useless and deprived from any prestige, 
and provide them with a feedback on their performance ranking.   
Our paper indicates that introducing ranking feedback motivates individuals to work 
harder, as the mean performance is significantly higher in the ranking treatment than in the 
baseline. This provides evidence that people care about their relative position, and that social 
comparisons increase motivation for work despite the absence of monetary incentives to 
outperform.  However, we also find that in this environment, some people are willing to incur a 
cost (over a quarter of their income) to artificially increase their relative position in their group 
without any expectation of monetary return of any sort, either by sabotaging the work of others or 
by increasing their own output artificially. Sabotage and redemption activities are wasteful (apart 
from the destruction from sabotage), as in the field some energy and effort (which could be devoted 
to other activities) must be devoted to implement these. In addition sabotage and redemption have 
some negative de-motivating effects on initial performance. Note that sabotage and redemption 
activities have been observed although our task does not require any particular talent; one can 
                                                 
26 In a repeated money burning experiment, Abbink and Sadrieh (2009) observe significantly more destruction in the 
game under full information compared to a treatment where subjects can hide their destruction behind random 
destruction. Similarly, Nikiforakis (2008) shows that in the presence of counter-punishment opportunities cooperators 
are less willing to punish free riders. As a result, cooperation breaks down and groups have lower earnings in 
comparison to a treatment without punishments where free riding is predominant. 
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suspect that with a more prestigious and meaningful task, we could observe an even stronger 
concern for performance ranking.  
Our work may have several managerial implications in terms of companies’ feedback 
policies. Our findings show that providing ranking feedback creates incentives for employees even 
when employees are paid a flat wage. As such, it is tempting to recommend that firms give regular 
feedback on ranking to their employees even under full wage compression. However, sufficient 
precautions should be taken to avoid that such positive effects of feedback incentives be totally 
offset by sabotage or cheating activities. Indeed, these feedback incentives may become 
detrimental to the company if employees can sabotage others’ work or artificially increase their 
performance. The firms may mitigate this problem by making binding announcements that such 
unethical activities, if detected, would be strongly penalized.  Furthermore it seems that making 
group identity more salient may also help in reducing sabotage.  Indeed, when individuals are 
matched with peers from the same school they are less likely to sabotage their in-groups. However, 
while group identity appears to discourage destructive competition among peers, it seems to favor 
rivalry, as peers from the same gender and from the same school are more likely to increase their 
performance artificially.    
The literature has established that the opportunities for sabotage or cheating may therefore 
undermine the power of tournaments and influence employers to choose wage compression by 
paying equal wages regardless of relative performance (Lazear, 1989; Falk et al. 2008).27 
According to Lazear, (1989), some wage compression may be optimal when the proportion of 
sabotage-prone workers (‘hawks’) in the firm is sufficiently high.  In the current paper, we show 
that even flat and compressed wage environments are not exempt from the occurrence of unethical 
activities when employees receive feedback on their ranking in performance. This finding 
mitigates the conclusion that wage compression may be preferable when the proportion of 
sabotage-prone workers is relatively high since flat-wage environment are not exempt from such 
activities. Although our paper is not directly aimed at comparing full wage compression and 
                                                 
27 Other factors may also explain the persistence of flat-wage schemes within firms including the role of egalitarian 
concerns (Ding et al., 2001; Bartling and von Siemens, 2010), monitoring costs, and centralization of authority 
(Prentice et al., 2007). Finally, some authors have investigated the reasons behind the persistence of flat-wage schemes 
in the public sector. These factors include the specificities of multi-faceted tasks and intrinsic motivation for public 
service that may compensate for quite low and relatively flat extrinsic incentives that the sector offers (Georgellis et 
al., 2011). 
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performance based schemes, it provides interesting findings regarding the issue of optimal wage 
dispersion. Since flat-wage schemes may also potentially lead to unethical activities, and due to 
the fact that they provide weaker incentives than performance-based schemes (Tafkov, 2012), one 
may reasonably argue that remuneration scheme tied to performance may be more efficient for the 
firm.  
A natural extension of this work is to compare the extent of unethical activities under both 
compensation schemes where unethical activities are available. Whether these activities are higher 
under a flat-wage scheme compared to a performance-based scheme is a priori unclear. On the one 
hand, individuals may have more incentives to artificially change performance under a 
performance-based scheme in order to increase their chance of winning the monetary prize. On the 
other hand, introducing performance-based schemes may also provide a more direct way to express 
one’s competitive preferences, making less clear the use of unethical acts to artificially raise one’s 
status.28 Whether the first effect dominates remains an empirical question that is left for future 
research.   
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Table 1. Determinants of effort  
 
Treatments 
without symbols 
 
Treatments with 
symbols 
 
All Treatments 
DependentVariable 
Initial 
performance Initial performance Initial performance 
Models RE GLSa RE GLSa RE GLSa RE Tobitb RE Tobitb 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Baseline Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Ranking 5.888*** 2.715** 5.535*** 5.884*** 4.408*** 
 (0.627)  (1.301) (0.691) (1.681) (1.711) 
Redemption 5.317*** 2.777** 5.107** 5.278*** 4.256** 
 (1.894) (1.132) (2.064) (1.797) (1.830) 
Sabotage 2.441* 0.998 2.202* 2.177 1.644 
 (1.332) (1.312) (1.290) (1.725) (1.757) 
Ranking*symbols   -2.799** -3.030** -2.813* 
   (1.161) (1.475) (1.503) 
Redemption*symbols   -2.206 -2.268 -2.800* 
   (2.252) (1.655) (1.686) 
Sabotage*symbols   -1.081 -1.068 -1.123 
   (1.692) (1.597) (1.627) 
Ranking*periods 6-10     2.972*** 
     (0.646) 
Redemption*periods 6-10     2.065*** 
     (0.696) 
Sabotage*periods 6-10     1.080 
     (0.670) 
Ranking*symb.*pds 6-10     -0.428 
     (0.568) 
Redemp.*symb*pds 6-10     1.066* 
     (0.641) 
Sabotage*symb*pds 6-10     0.110 
     (0.620) 
Periods 6-10 0.095 0.314 0.389 0.254 -1.719*** 
 (0.459) (0.498) (0.352) (0.166) (0.507) 
Demographics Yes yes Yes Yes Yes 
      
Constant 21.391*** 22.182*** 21.752*** 21.365*** 22.342*** 
  (0.966) (0.979) (0.819) (1.521) (1.539) 
Observations 2700 2850 5010 5010 5010 
Left-censored obs. - - - 292 292 
Log likelihood - - - -16071.18 -16052.21 
R squared      
 
Notes: RE GLS a = Random Effects Generalized Least Squares; RE Tobitb = Random Effects Tobit. *** Significant at the 0.01 
level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. Since observations within a session may be dependent, estimates are conducted 
with robust standard errors clustered on sessions.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses. 
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 Table 2. First differences in work effort by treatment (Random-Effects GLS models) 
 
Treatments  Ranking Sabotage Redemption 
 Models  (1) (2) (3) 
Ranki
1 in (t-1)  Ref. Ref. Ref. 
     
Ranki
2 in (t-1)  1.260*** 0.363 1.043*    
  (0.249) (0.573) (0.581) 
Ranki
3 in (t-1)  2.156***  1.821***     3.345***    
  (0. 369) (0.498) (0.709) 
Ranki
2 in (t-1)*symbol 0.119     0.167         0.825  
 (0.308) (0.630) (0.506) 
Ranki
3 in (t-1)*symbol 0.174    0.133       -0.112   
 (0.406)    (0.408)      (0.690) 
Ranki
3 in (t-1)*   2.942 -1.708* 
Change  (1.856) (0.940) 
Sabotage received  -0.246**  
in (t-1)  (0.125)  
Sabotage assigned  0.142***  
in (t-1)  (0.029)  
Redemp. Purchased   0.236*** 
in (t-1)   (0.063) 
Constant  -0.707*** -0.534**    -1.282***    
   (0.134) (0.268)    (0.307) 
Observations  1512 1296 1215 
 
Notes: *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level. “Sabotage received”, “sabotage assigned”, 
and “redemption purchased” refer to the number of points.  Robust standard errors are in parentheses, clustered at the 
session level. Demographics that are invariant across periods are not included in the estimates. 
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Table 3. Determinants of redemption and sabotage activities (random-effects Tobit models) 
 
 
 Dependent variable 
 
Number of points 
purchased  by i in 
Redemption treatment 
Number of points assigned 
by i to j in  
Sabotage treatment  
Models  (1)  (2) (3) (4) 
Initial performance 0.443** 0.439* 0.642*** 0.705*** 
 (0.225) (0.225) (0.171) (0.199) 
Initial performance 2  -0.008* -0.008 -0.009*** -0.010*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.003) (0.004) 
Ranki1 Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. 
Ranki2 2.026*** 2.179** 1.759*** -0.617 
 (0.937) (0.960) (0.572) (0.764) 
Ranki3 3.340*** 3.410*** 2.784*** 1.107 
 (1.145) (1.241) (0.710) (0.913) 
Tie in performance 2.637** 2.512** 3.174*** 3.047*** 
 (1.088) (1.071) (0.810) (0.865) 
Ranki2* Rankj1      3.979*** 
      (0.679) 
Ranki3* Rankj2      2.065** 
      (0.876) 
Treat. with symbols 0.416 0.671 3.863*** 3.252*** 
 (1.961) (1.976) (0.883) (0.934) 
Periods 6-10 -3.351*** -3.082*** -0.729* -0.407 
 (0.697) (0.722) (0.427) (0.474) 
Sabotage received by i    0.209*** 
in (t-1)    (0.081) 
Mean cum. Rank1-i   -0.683  0.271 
   (2.196)  (1.692) 
Mean cum. Rank3-i   -2.327  -4.026** 
   (2.025)  (1.758) 
Same gender as co-   1.447**  -0.058 
Workers   (0.721)  (0.520) 
Same school as co-   3.063**  -2.645*** 
Workers   (1.207)  (0.998) 
Demographics Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Constant -21.856*** -22.327*** -25.329*** -25.827*** 
  (3.879) (3.943) (2.766) (3.322) 
Observations 1350 1350 2880 2592 
Left-censored obs. 1144 1144 2567 2316 
Log likelihood -918.495 -911.250 -1453.043 -1261.535 
 
Notes: Data from the treatments with symbols and without symbols are pooled. *** Significant at the 0.01 level; ** 
at the 0.05 level; * at the 0.1 level.  Standard errors are in parentheses.  
 33 
Fig.1. Evolution of the average initial performance over time by treatment (without symbols) 
 
Fig.2. Distribution of performance per treatment (without symbols) 
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